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T

HE doctrine of promissory estoppel is an outstanding modem example of the way in which the Anglo-American legal system
develops significant rules and principles out of the day-to-day decisions
of our courts.
Progress in the law comes about through the formulation and acceptance of generalizations. However, merely stating the results of a
number of different instances does not result in clarification and simplification. That comes only when the precedents are studied with a
view to discovering the ''binding thread of principle that runs through
them all."1 Such a principle, if discovered in the course of the appraisal of a series of cases, will make for a more ready understanding
of the cases which have already been decided. Even more important,
however, is the future use which can be made of the principle thus discovered. It may thereafter be employed in variant and diverse fact
situations to produce workable, logical and rational solutions to problems which had previously been solved only by resort to fiction or by
the use of historical anomalies and conceptual distortions. As Cohen
has so aptly remarked, "A legal system that works with general principles has powerful instruments .... [A] generalized jurisprudence
enlarges the law's control over the diversity of legal situations. It is
like fishing with large nets instead of with single lines."2
One such generalization or principle is the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. It is thus expressed in the Restatement of Contracts: "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
,. Dean, Temple University School of Law.-Ed.
1 .A?.mru:CAN I.Aw INsTlTUTE, CoNTRAcrs RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft 1-3, CoMMEN'I'ARIEs, Restatement No. 2, 19-20 (1926). These commentaries were prepared by Professor Samuel Williston who served as Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts for the
Institute.
2 Cohen, "The Place of Logic in the Law," 29 HARv. L. REv. 622 at 625 (1916).
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binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."3 The express formulation of this doctrine is recent,4 it having received open recognition only in the past thirty years. But some of the
cases relied upon to explain and justify the doctrine were decided as
long ago as the reign of Queen Anne.5 If the doctrine is new, not in
its application or in its origins, but only in its express formulation, 6
one may inquire as to whether cases of such antiquity may be legitimately employed to explain and justify the doctrine.
In our legal system, where .reliance is placed upon precedents derived from litigated cases, one must devise some means by which to
interpret the general rule induced from a particular decision. The
ambit fixed for a specific precedent depends upon several factors: the
decision of the court, the facts, the reasoning employed, and how the
rule (obtained by induction from the case) fits into a system containing other rules which, for the time being, have presupposed validity.
The formulation of the particular generalization for which the decision
is authority is called "determining the ratio decidendi of the case."•
Now any one decision may be subsumed under innumerable principles of varying particularity.8 How broad a generalization will a
judicial opinion support? Citation of precedent in support of a generalization, then, requires that one formulate a policy to determine the
limitations imposed by the doctrine of ratio decidendi.
There are many cases, for example, where courts have enforced a
gratuitous promise which was followed by justifiable reliance on the
part of the promisee.9 How much weight should be given to the factor of "reliance" in formulating a generalization from these particular
a AMERICAN LAw lNsTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs §90 (1932) (hereinafter
cited as CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT).
4 As I have indicated elsewhere [Boyer, ''Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine,'' 98 Umv. PA. L. Rav. 459 (1950)], apparently the pioneer use
of the term '"promissory estoppel" occurs in 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, 1st ed., §139
(1920).
5 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
6Llewellyn, ''The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract,'' 47 YALE L.J. 1243 at
1252, note 25 (1938): " ••• Is §90 of the Contracts Restatement, or §45, 'new' doctrine?
The cases say: Both are rather belated explicit doctrine."
7 Goodhart, ''Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,'' 40 YALE L.J. 161-183
(1930), reprinted in VANDERBILT, STUDY.ING LAw 493-525 (1945); PATTERSON, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE 87 (1940).
~ 8 CoHEN, LAw AND nm SoCIAL ORDER 214 (1933); Oliphant, "A Return To Stare
Decisis,'' 14 A.B.A.J. 71 at 73 (1928); PATTERSON, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 87
(1940).
9 lliustrative are the following: In re Stack's Estate, 164 Minn. 57, 204 N.W. 546
(1925) (adding to buildings); Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507,
1 A. (2d) 146 (1938) (extensive improvements made to property); Steele v. Steele, 75 Md.
477, 23 A. 959 (1892) (purchase of property in reliance on father's gratuitous promise to
contribute to price).
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decisions? May such cases be cited as authority for the proposition
that reliance is an acceptable substitute for bargain, especially if the
court did not make such a factor one of the expressed grounds for its
decision? The answer to those questions lies in one's conception of
ratio decidendi.
PRECEDENTS AND RA.no DEcIDENDI

According to Goodhart, the precedent value of a case is to be
found by "taking account (a) of the facts treated by the judge as
material, and (b) his decision based on them."10 Hence, Goodhart
would not rely on any decision that failed to find such reliance on the
promise to be a material fact. In his view, if a proposition involves
(as a material fact) any fact that the court did not deem material in
deciding the previous case, the previous case should not be cited as
authority for the proposition.
Oliphant, on the other hand, contends that the principle for which
a case stands is to be discovered from "a consideration of the facts
and the decision of the court."11 He would interpret a precedent as
a reaction of the court to the facts of the previous case; he would not
limit its authority to what the court said was material. Oliphant argues
that judicial rulings may be cited as authority for a generalization or
"proposition of law which includes existence of facts appearing in the
record of the case but which the court did not treat as material."12
So, according to his view, the cases involving reliance and promissory
estoppel mentioned above ( where the facts show that there was reliance
on a gratuitous promise but the court did not state that reliance was
material) could be deemed holdings in support of the general proposition that reliance on a promise is an acceptable reason for its enforcement.
Goodhart's view appeals to the counselor; it affords a more certain
basis for prediction as to when the court will accept a proposition
as binding-and a precedent as prescriptive of the judicial norm.
Oliphant's view, on the other hand, appeals to the advocate; it permits
him to cite (particularly where he is urging the adoption of a new
legal principle) many more legal precedents than are authoritative
under Goodhart's theory of ratio decidendi. Oliphant's theory takes
10 Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case," 40 YALE L.J. 161 at 182
(1930).
11 Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928); see also PATI'ERSON,
LEO'.l'URBS ON JURISPRUDJ!NCB 87 (1940).
12 Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928).
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a long view. Thus, it appeals to a writer who attempts to synthesize,
simplify and justify a large group of cases. And American courts and
legal writers incline to Oliphant's theory.13 His attitude towards
ratio decidendi is the one adopted here. So, if in certain cases herein
cited the factor of reliance on a promise is present, that element will
be treated as material to the decision of the controversy even though
the court did not expressly say that the reliance was material.
If this use of cases as precedents is not acceptable, it is still true
that such cases demonstrate the worth of the element of reliance in
considering the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
And they are proof of the adaptability of that doctrine to the realities
of litigation and human conduct.
Cases decided prior to the formulation and recognition of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel which reach results contrary to it are
not necessarily authorities against the doctrine. If, for example, the
principles of the doctrine were neither brought to the attention of the
court in the arguments and briefs of counsel, nor considered by the
court in its written opinion, it would seem erroneous to conclude that
a decision which happened to be contrary to the doctrine was authority
against it. Who can say what would have been the decision of the court
had the particular case been supported by arguments based upon the
doctrine? Therefore, in this study, decisions contrary to the doctrine
but not taking it into account, though adverted to and examined, are not
considered as necessarily opposed to promissory estoppel as a basis for
contractual liability.
FRAMEWORK FoR A PRINCIPLE

The American Law Institute adopts a narrow definition of consideration, one based upon the theory of bargain and exchange.14 At
the same time it openly acknowledges that a number of promises do
create legal rights and duties even though not bargained for and given
in return for an act, a forbearance, a change in legal relation, or a
return promise.15 Thus under the view of the Restatement, a promise
13 PATTERSON, Ll!CTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (1940).
14CoNTRACTS REsTATEMENT §75: "(I) Consideration for

a promise is (a) an act
other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction
of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise• •••" Emphasis supplied.
llS CoNTRACTs REsTATEMENT, Topic 4, p. 100. Informal Contracts Without Assent or
Consideration, §§85-90. Section 86 (promise to pay debt barred by statute of limitations),
section 87 (promise to pay debt discharged in bankruptcy), section 88 (promise to perform
a duty in spite of non-performance of a condition), section 89 (promise to perform a voidable duty), and section 90 (promise reasonably inducing definite and substantial action) are
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accompanied by a bargained-for exchange will create rights and duties;
so may certain other promises, though not made in return for an
equivalent.
If there has been no attempt to exchange an act, a forbearance,
a change in legal relations, or a return promise for the promise for
which enforcement is sought, there is no bargain. The promise has
not been purchased; it is gratuitous. When asked whether a mere
gratuitous promise creates legal rights and duties our law has generally
answered in the negative.16 Though the promisor does not bargain for
anything in exchange for his promise, should he nevertheless be
bound? One may approach a solution to the question from either of
two angles. For example, one may ask how much more than a mere
gratuitous promise is necessary to impose liability. Or one may seek
to discover how much less than the exchange of a bargained-for equivalent will still find the court enforcing the promise. Between the
extremes of the naked promise and the requested equivalent there may
be a place for the enforcement of promises which are accompanied by
more than the former and by less than the latter. That there is a
place for such promises is convincingly demonstrated by the fact that
our courts do enforce some promises that are not cast in the mold of
bargains.17 Among the promises so enforced are some which may be
classified as examples of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The modem statement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
contained in section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. 18 As there
formulated, the doctrine requires the presence of three constitutive
elements before enforcement will be given to a promise which has
all accepted by the Institute as instances in which enforcement of the promise is granted,
despite the absence of a bargain.
l6 CoNTRA.CTS RESTATEMENT §75, comment a: "No duty is generally imposed on one
who makes an informal promise unless the promise is supported by sufficient consideration."
Corbin in ANsoN, CONTRACTS (hereinafter cited as ANsoN) § 121 (5th Amer. ed. Corbin,
1930): "In each case we must ask, Was anything given in exchange for the promise as its
agreed equivalent? If not, the promise is gratuitous, and is not binding unless it is within
the exceptions discussed hereafter"; WILI.IsTON, CoNTRACTS (hereinafter cited as WILI.IsTON), §112 (rev. ed. 1936): " ••• A would not be liable on his promise because it was
gratuitous"; CoRBIN, CoNTRA.CTS §114 (1950): "An informal promise without consideration, in any of the senses of that term, creates no legal duty and is not enforceable. • • • In
every case, however, an informal promise is never enforceable if it stands utterly alone."
17 See note 15. The Restatement adopted the bargain and exchange theory of contracts (§75) and then codified certain out-type promises as exceptions thereto in order to
preserve the symmetry of the system. One may properly consider it significant of growth
in the law that the doctrine of promissory estoppel (§90) was included in the codification.
18 For Williston's pioneer discussion see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 1st ed., §139
(1920); his latest discussion is found in WILI.ISTON, §§139-140 (1936). For another recent
discussion, see, CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS (1950) (hereinafter cited as CORBIN) §§194-209.

644

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

induced unbargained-for reliance. These include: (1) the making
of a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee, (2) action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character induced by the promise, and (3) a determination that injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.19
These elements constitute the framework of the doctrine. It is evident,
that this doctrine does not advocate the extreme view that all promises
should be enforced, yet it does give flexibility to our concept of contracts by avoiding the narrowness which results from enforcing only
bargain transactions.
How can one explain promissory estoppel and its enforcement of
unbargained-for promises? Obviously, only by a study of the precedents for the doctrine and by an evaluation of the contribution which
each type of precedent makes to the doctrine as a whole. Such an
examination may well demonstrate the manner in which we can
synthesize a principle or rule of law out of variant cases. By the
universalizing of the rules accepted in particular fact situations and
their application to analogous, but differing, cases our law has developed and evolved. Promissory estoppel is the most striking recent
illustration of such a development.
The precedents which have been employed in constructing the
doctrine may be found in at least five different fact situations: (1)
charitable subscriptions, (2) parol promises to give land, (3) gratuitous
bailment, ( 4) gratuitous agency, and (5) a miscellany including such
diversities as bonus and pension plans, waiver, and rent reductions.
It is proposed in the remainder of this article to examine and discuss,
in turn, each of these categories to determine the circumstances under
which gratuitous promises are often enforced. The cases will disclose
the origins of the doctrine of promissory estoppel; they will also illustrate the way in which that doctrine was evolved from precedent.

A. Charitable Subscriptions
The charitable subscription has long occupied an anomalous
position in American contract law. On its face, a promise to make a
gift to charity does not purport to be a contract. Gift and contract
are antitheticals; the former appears to arise out of generosity, the
latter out of bargain and quid pro quo. Despite the obvious fact that
10 See Boyer, ''Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine,''
98 Umv. PA. L. REv. 459-498 (1950), for an analysis of these elements: (1) The Promise,
pp. 461-470; (2) Action-in-Reliance, pp. 470-482; (3) Avoidance of Injustice, pp. 482-494.
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one who says he intends to make a gift is not making a bargain,20 the
courts have often treated such a promise as falling within the latter
category. In view of the tendency of our legal system to enforce only
those promises which have been purchased in exchange for a price,
such a treatment of gift promises is understandable.
The charitable subscription has been litigated many times during
the past one hundred years.21 The problem has been discussed at
length by the authors of legal treatises22 and has appealed to writers
for the legal periodicals.23 The cases dealing with charitable subscriptions bulked so large that section 90 of the Contracts Restatement
was offered as a solution to the technical difficulties confronting a
court which is asked to enforce promissory gifts to charity.24
As Mr. Williston has pointed out, promises to charities are
20BnoWN, PERSONAL Pno.P.ERTY §4 (1936); WILLISTON, §20; GRISMORE, CoNTRACTS
(1947) (hereinafter cited as GRISMORE) §59; CORBIN, §4.
21 One of the earliest cases is Phillip's Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Tyng. 113
(Mass. 1814); one of the latest is American University v. Collings, (Md. App. 1948) 59 A
(2d) 333. Cases are collected in 33 A.L.R. 615 (1924), 38 A.L.R. 858 (1925), 44 A.L.R.
1333 (1926), 90 A.L.R. 1036 (1934), 95 A.L.R. 1305 (1935), 115 A.L.R. 589 (1938),
151 A.L.R. 1238 (1944). It must be remembered that the English view denies enforcement
to charitable subscriptions. Re Hudson, [1885] 54 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 811. So does the Canadian: Governors of Dalhousie College v. Boutilier, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 593 (S.Ct. of Canada).
For complete annotation on the Canadian cases, see Kanigsberg, "Subscription Contracts,"
[1931] 4 D.L.R. 702. For an interesting variant, see Re Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institu•
tion for Advancement of Learning, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 689 (S.Ct. of Canada) applying the
law of Quebec and enforcing such a promise because there was a ''lawful cause."
22W1LLISTON, §§116, 139; GRISMORE, §63; ANsoN, §§126, 126a (these sections are
Corbin's own work); CoRBIN, §198; I PAGB, CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., §559 (1919); PARSONS,
CoNTRACTs, 9th ed., *454, *491 (1904); I ELLIOTT, CoNTRACTs, §228 (1913); Pouocx,
CONTRACTS, 9th ed., I 78 (1921); Cmrn, CONTRACTS, 17th ed., 34 (1921); ELLIOTT AND
CHAMBBRS, THB CoLLEGBS AND THB CoIDlTS, Part V, Financial Support-Validity of Subscriptions (1936 and 1940 eds.).
23 A partial list follows. Articles: Billig, ''The Problem of Consideration in Charitable
Subscriptions," 12 CoRN. L.Q. 467 (1927); Page, "Consideration: Genuine and Synthetic,"
1947 Wis. L. R.Ev. 483; Sharp, "Promissory Liability," 7 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. I and 250
(1939, 1940); Shattuck, "Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?" 35 MICH. L. RBv. 908
(1937). Comments: 39 W. VA. L. Q. 159 (1933); 8 CoRN. L. Q. 57 (1922); 13 ST.
JoBN's L. RBv. 127 (1938). Indeed, so fruitful has been the field that a number of articles
and comments have been published which consider the problem only with regard to a single
state. Among these are Taylor, "Charitable Subscription Contracts and the Kentucky Law,"
29 KY. L. J. 23 (1940); Rothberg, "Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel in New Jersey," 2
INTRA-MURAL L. RBv. 176 (1947); I Ami:. L. RBv. 69 (1946); 4 UNIV. Cm. L. Rsv. 431
(1937); 5 N.Y. Umv. L. RBv. 153 (1928).
24 In AMBRICAN LAw !NsTITOT.ll, CoNTRACTs RBsTAT.EMBNT, Tentative Draft 1-3,
CoMMBNTARms, Restatement No. 2, 14-20 (1926), Mr. Williston, speaking of what was
then §88 and now is §90, said, "In a number of cases at the present day, it is still law that
reliance on a promise, though there has been no price or consideration paid for it, renders
the promisor liable•••• Charitable subscriptions are generally enforced in the United States
at least after action in reliance upon them has been taken. • • • [T]he Section is a useful coordination of the classes of cases enumerated above." In 1906 Mr. Williston had referred
to "the anomaly of the charitable subscription." W1LLisToN's W AU>'s Pouocx: ON CoNTRACTS, 3d ed., 186 (1906).
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generally enforced after the promisee has taken action in reliance
thereon. But merely stating the result that is reached in charitable
subscription cases does not justify that result. Justification requires
examination of the facts, as well as the decisions, of the cases which
enforce promises to make gifts to charities. In addition it requires
that the result be explained in terms of the existing legal system or as
an exception thereto.
Grounds given as justification for enforcing charitable subscriptions
have been at least four in number: (1) the subscription is an offer to
enter into a contract which, when accepted, ripens into one; (2) where
more than one person subscribes to the charity, the promises of each
serve as cqnsideration for the promises of the others; (3) acceptance of
the subscription implies a promise on the part of the charity to employ
the anticipated funds for the purpose for which they are subscribed,
thus providing exchanged promises as consideration; and ( 4) detrimental action in justifiable reliance upon the promised subscription
creates a promissory estoppel which needs no consideration.25 Of these
in their order.
As has been pointed out by Grismore,26 subscription agreements
are either given (1) for business purposes, or (2) for charity. If for
business purposes, there is no doubt of a bargain; the usual problem is
to find just what was "the precise thing requested as the return or
exchange for the promise." With the subscription for charity, however,
the problem is much more difficult. The many justifications employed
when courts enforce charitable subscriptions indicate the difficulty.
Were the difficulty of justification less, the explanations would be
fewer in number.
A court may find that a subscription to a charity did contain
an offer to enter into a contract with it,27 that it was part and parcel
of a business transaction. The real difficulty is in finding such a
fact situation, not in knowing what to do when it is discovered.
If it is decided that the promisor sought an exchange, it is then
necessary to determine whether he asked for an act or a promise,
i.e., whether the offer looked to a unilateral or a bilateral contract.
Several cases have regarded the charitable subscription as an offer
which sought a return promise froni the charity. If there is such a return promise, there has been an exchange; the promisor has received
25WILLISTON, §116; GrusMORB,
26 GRISMORE, §63.
27 In Rogers v. Galloway Female

§63;

CoRllIN,

§198.
I

College, 64 Ark. 627, 44 S.W. 454 (1898), there was
an offer to pay $2,500 in return for locating a college pi subscriber's town. The court
properly treated the case as a bargain transaction.
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legally sufficient consideration, and no technical reason prevents
enforcement.28 In a number of other instances, the promise to make the
gift has been regarded as an offer for a unilateral contract. When the
charity does the act which the court finds is requested in exchange for
the subscription, there is said to be an acceptance which creates a
binding obligation on the promisor.29 Provided the subscriber was
seeking such an exchange for his promise, there is no objection to such
a result.
But there are Haws in this solution-Haws which have been
pointed out before.30 The charity is not engaged in a commercial transaction and the subscriber does nothing but promise to make a gift. He
is trying to bestow a benefaction, not secure a price for his promise.
To talk of the consideration for his gift-promise is to employ a paradox.31 The courts, when faced with such an enigma, often try to solve
it by searching for some condition performed by the promisee which
can be interpreted as the price requested and given in exchange for the
promise to make the gift. Once found, it is easy to say that by its
performance the promisee has suffered detriment. Under such treatment "legal" consideration is easily supplied. Such a view ignores the
fact that the performance of any particular act may be either a condition or a consideration.32
As a variant of this approach, it is to be noted that even when
the promise is construed as an offer looking towards a unilateral
contract, it is not always necessary that the entire act be completed
before liability is incurred. Some courts impose liability if the promisee
28 Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Continental Illinois Bank, 284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N.E.
(2d) 425 (1936) (both parties "had an intention to enter into a binding contract"); 'Tioga
County Hospital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N.Y.S. 460 (1937) (Here defendant subscribed on condition that the X-ray room be designated in honor of his father. This was
based on consideration and there was at least an implied promise to build the hospital).
29 Stone v. Prescott Special School District, 119 Ark. 553, 178 S.W. 399 (1915).
(Here the subscription offer was accepted and the building erected. The act of acceptance
bound the subscriber); First Trust and Savings Bank of Pasadena v. Coe College, 8 Cal.
App. (2d) 195, 47 P. (2d) 481 (1935) (consideration supplied by setting up the fund);
Grand Lodge I.O.G.T. v. Farnham, 70 Cal. 158, 11 P. 592 (1886) ("A promise to pay a
subscription to •.• some charitable object is a mere offer, which may be revoked at any time
before it is accepted"); McClure v. Wilson, 43 ill. 356 (1867); McDonald v. Gray, 11
Iowa 508, 79 Am. Dec. 509 (1861); New Jersey Orthopaedic Hospital v. Wright, 95 N.J.L.
462, 113 A. 144 (1921); Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18 (1854); Philomath College v.
Hartless, 6 Ore. 158, 25 Am. Rep. 510 (1876).
so Billig, "The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions," 12 CoRN. L.Q.
467 (1927).
31 Notes, 8 CoRN. L.Q. 57 at 58 (1922); 24 CoL. L. REv. 896 at 899 (1924); 28 CoL.
L. REv. 642 (1928).
S2WILI.ISToN, §112; GmsMoRE, §59; CoRllIN, §151.
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has merely begun performance of the act.83 Such rulings afford a
new field for the employment of section 45 of the Contracts Restatement in protecting the offeree in offers for unilateral contracts requiring
time in performance. The quarrel is not with the employment of
section 45, though. It really is with the forced construction which turns
a condition attached to a gratuitous promise into the price paid for that
promise.
A number of persons desiring the accomplishment of common
objects enjoy the privilege of exchanging mutual promises to effectuate
that end. In such an agreement, the exchanged promises furnish consideration. 84 American courts have sometimes applied this principle to
charitable subscriptions, holding that the promise of each subscriber
furnishes consideration for the promises of all the others.35 But rarely
does one of the other subscribers sue to enforce the promise; rather,
such suits are instituted by the charity. When it is permitted to recover,
the theory of the case must be such as to imply that the charity was a
third party donee beneficiary in the "contract" between the subscribers.
Actually, of course, there is, in most of the reported cases, no exchange
of promises between the subscribers; each really makes a promise to the
charity, not to his fellow signers of the pledge. With this as the fact
situation, the subscription becomes a promise to give to the charity
because others are giving, not an exchange of promises between subscribers. Motive, socially desirable motive, there is; but not consideration in the bargain sense.36 Justifying recovery on the so-called
"mutual promises" theory is, at best, but a rationalization. Such an
explanation accords with neither the facts as commonly found in such
cases nor the law.
Other courts enforce charitable subscriptions on the theory of
an implied promise to devote the proceeds, when paid, to carrying out
the purposes for which the charity was organized.37 Of course, there is
88 Tioga County Hospital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N.Y.S. 460 (1937) (defendant
cancelled his subscription two days after it was given. Plaintiff in the meantime had named
the X-ray room in honor of defendant's father); Brokaw v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143
N.W. 1087 (1913) (college secured other subscriptions and an extension of its charter).
84WILLISTON, §§117, 118; GRISMORE, §63.
85 Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347 (1874); Higert v. Trustees, 53 Ind. 326
(1876); Petty v. Trustees of Church of Christ, 95 Ind. 278 (1883); First Presbyterian
Church of Mt. Vernon v. Dennis, 178 Iowa 1352, 161 N.W. 183 (1917); Cotner College
v. Hyland, 133 Kan. 322, 299 P. 607 (1931); Comstock v. Howd, 15 Mich. 236 (1867);
Congregational Society v. Percy, 6 N.H. 164 (1833); George v. Harris, 4 N.H. 533 (1829).
36 Professor Williston makes the additional point that "the earlier subscriptions would
be open to the objection of being past consideration so far as a later subscription was concerned." WILLISTON, §116, p. 407. See Corbin, "Non-Binding Promises as Consideration,''
26 CoL. L. REv. 550 (1926).
37 Barnett v. Franklin College, IO Ind. App. 103, 37 N.E. 427 (1893); American
Legion v. Thompson, 121 Kan. 124, 245 P. 744 (1926); Collier v. Baptist Education Soci-
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no implied promise in such a situation. There is no material from which
to construct one. Here is no wealth of recitals, nor is there any
writing "instinct with an obligation"38 which is usually required to
raise such a promise. It is as difficult to find a request for such an
implied promise as it is to find the promise itself. And unless the
promise is requested, it can not serve as the bargained-for exchange
which creates obligation. Even if there were such an implied promise,
it would not be legally sufficient as consideration. All that the charity
is promising to do is to use its funds as it is already bound to do.39 And
promising to do what one is already u:ader a legal duty to perform,
particularly where it is a public duty, is not acceptable as a consideration
that will support a bargain.40 Professor Williston summarily disposes
of this theory by saying that "a promise to give a trustee money in trust
for another is no more binding than a promise to give the money
directly to the beneficiary."41 It would appear that an incorporated
charity has no legal authority to use its resources except in accordance
with its charter powers, so one may readily accept this conclusion.
Occasionally cases do arise where the promise is to use the "gife'
in a particular, but not required, way in furtherance of the charity's
objects. In such a situation, it is proper for the parties to bargain
for such use. Naturally, if they have done so, the subscriber's promise
has been bought and paid for and is enforced.42 The only question
(if a bargain is requisite to contractual obligation) is whether the
parties were bargaining. If they were not, it is erroneous to search
for a spurious consideration in an implied promise constructed by a
court in the exercise of a vivid imagination.
At least three lines of reasoning (those discussed above) have
been employed in an attempt to justify, on a bargain basis, the enforcement of charitable subscriptions. All have been ineffectual, for
ety, 8 B. Mon. 68 (47 Ky. 1847); Trustees of Kentucky Female Orphan School v. Fleming,
10 Bush 234 (73 Ky. 1874); Trustees of Parsonage Fund v. Ripley, 6 Me. 442 (1830);
Trustees of Central Institute v. Haskell, 73 Me. 140 (1882); Central Maine General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191, 132 A. 417 (1926); Ladies Collegiate Institute v. French, 16
Gray 196 (82 Mass. 1860); Albert Lea College v. Brown, 88 Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672
(1903); Nebraska Wesleyan University v. Griswold's Estate, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N.W. 609
(1925); Baptist Female University of North Carolina v. Borden, 132 N.C. 476, 44 S.E. 47,
1007 (1903).
sswood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
39Billig, "The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions,'' 12 CoRN. L.Q.
467 (1927); WILLISTON, §116.
40 Co:NTRACTS Rl!STATilMENT, §§76(a), 78; WILLISTON, §130; GrosMoRE, §65; ANsoN,
§137; CoRBIN, §180.
41 WILLISTON, §116, p. 408.
4 2 Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N.E. 427 (1893) (to use only
the income for current operating expenses); American Legion v. Thompson, 121 Kan. 124,
245 P. 744 (1926) (to build a particular building).
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while they may explain some particular cases, they do not apply to the
characteristic charitable subscription where there is no bargain. Dissatisfaction with such rationalizations has led some courts to adopt
an alternate approach in deciding the cases. This approach is realistic!
It admits that a charitable subscription is not a bargain, that the subscriber (when he made the promise) was not actuated by a desire to
obtain an equivalent in exchange. It recognizes the futility of seeking
consideration where there is no bargain.
These courts recognize that the promise is to make a gift to
charity. If the promisee substantially changes his position in reliance
upop. this promise and the change was foreseeable by the promisor,
then the decision is that the promisor is "estopped" to plead a lack of
consideration for his promise.43 Promissory estoppel finds in such decisions an outstanding precedent.
·
Of prime importance in these cases is the emphasis which the
courts place on the detrimental action taken in reliance on the promise.
Illustrative instances of action and reliance which have sufficed to
bind the promisor include: making purchases connected with the
erection of a church,4 4 contracting to erect a building,45 beginning the
erection of a building,46 completing the erection of a building,47 and
buying land, erecting a building thereon and thereafter operating a
43 Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N.W. 74 (1887) (Such a
note can be defended against unless the donee has made expenditures or entered upon
engagements based on such promises, so that he will suffer loss or injury if the note is not
paid. "This is based upon the equitable principle that . . • the donor should be estopped
from pleading lack of consideration"); Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113 (1854); Wesleyan
· Seminary v. Fisher, 4 Mich. 514 (1857) ("Under such circumstances, no impeachment
of the consideration, short of illegality or fraud, could be permitted •.."); In re Stack's
Estate, 164 Minn. 57, 204 N.W. 546 at 547 (1925) ("A third theory is that . . . the
promisor comes within the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel"); School
District of Kansas City v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S.W. 656 (1897) (executors estopped
to plead want of consideration); In re Chavez's Estate, 35 N.M. 130, 290 P. 1020 (1930)
(there is consideration or an estoppel, whichever is preferred); I. & I. Holding Corp. v.
Gainsburg, 251 App. Div. 550, 296 N.Y.S. 752 (1937), affd. 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E. (2d)
532 (1938) ("The acts of the hospital .•• in reliance upon pledge made by defendants •••
furnished the consideration ••• and created the promissory estoppel"); Cohen v. Congregation Casseur Israel, 30 Pa. Co. Ct. 623 (1904) ("It is binding ••• upon the principle
that the promisor is estopped from denying his liability"); Furman University v. Waller,
124 S.C. 68, 117 S.E. 356 (1922). See annotation, Consideration For Subscription Agreements, 38 A.L.R. 868 (1925), supplemented in 44 A.L.R. 1340 (1926), 57 A.L.R. 986
(1928), 95 A.L.R. 1305 (1935), 115 A.L.R. 589 (1938), and 151 A.L.R. 1238 (1944).
44 Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Brydon, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 676, 41 P. (2d) 377
(1935).
45Trustees of University of Pennsylvania v. Coxe's Exrs., 277 Pa. 512, 121 A. 314
(1923); Hopkins v. Upshur, 20 Tex. 89 (1851).
46 University of Southern California v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 P. 949 (1929).
47Y.M.C.A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S.E. 1075 (1913); White v. Scott, 26 Kan.
476 (1881); Presbyterian Society v. Beach, 74 N.Y. 72 (1878).
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college for several years. 48 Even Goodhart would agree with Oliphant49
that such rulings are authority for the proposition that detrimental
change of position in foreseeable reliance upon a gratuitous promise
results in its enforcement, for those courts say that the reliance is a
"material" fact upon which the rulings are based.
The reliance which will impose liability for the charitable subscription is not confined to action directly related to the construction of
buildings. Even borrowing money to pay a pre-existing indebtedness
has been held sufficient,50 as has paying money to charities.51 Consulting an architect and trying to raise funds with which to build a
church,5 2 as well as holding an election58 are additional examples. All
of them illustrate the generalization to be drawn from the cases: Where
a promisee has made expenditures or incurred a legal obligation in
reliance on the subscription,5 4 as the promisor should have expected,
that is sufficient reason to impose liability. When such liability is
imposed, the courts are demonstrating that reliance plays a role in determining contract liability as well as does bargain.
The difficulties inherent in the charitable subscription cases are
illustrated in the varied explanations offered by those courts which
seek to enforce them on the basis of bargain concepts. These difficulties stem from the courts' views as to the basis of contract liability.
If one belongs to that school which recognizes only bargain and exchange as a basis for contractual liability, one is likely to be confronted
with enigma and paradox when asked to enforce a promise to make a
gift. "Unbargained.-for" reliance does not slide easily into a frame
which has been carpentered to fit the exchange concept. This is evidenced by the theories advanced to justify enforcement. Finding
either (I) offers for unilateral or bilateral contracts, or (2) an exchange
of promises between subscribers, or (3) a promise by the charity to
use donations only for authorized purposes, when what one really
48 Koch v. Lay, Garnishee of Webster College,
49 See articles cited at notes 10 and 11 supra.

36 Mo. 147 (1866).

50 Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401, 5 Am. Rep. 51
(1870); United Presbyterian Church v. Baird, 60 Iowa 237, 14 N.W. 303 (1882).
51Scott v. Triggs, 76 Ind. App. 69, 131 N.E. 415 (1921).
52 First M.E. Church v. Howard's Est., 133 Misc. 723, 233 N.Y.S. 451 (1929).
53 Thompson v. Board of Supervisors of Mercer County, 40 Ill. 379 at 385 (1866)
"Who can say [his offer] did not influence [the voters] •••?" Query: Where the voters
"promisees"?
54 Pryor v. Cain, 25 Ill. 263 (1861); Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary, 113 Ill. 618
(1885); Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113 (1854); Trustees of Amherst Academy v. Cowls,
6 Pick. (23 Mass.) 427 (1828); Cottage Street Methodist Episcopal Church v. Kendall,
121 Mass. 528 (1877); Trustees of Christian University v. Hoffmann, 95 Mo. App. 488,
69 S.W. 474 (1902); Rouff v. Washington & Lee University, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48
S.W. (2d) 483.
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seeks is a justification for enforcing a· gift-promise, all demonstrate
"an uneasy judicial conscience."55 Promissory estoppel relieves this
uneasy conscience and provides a satisfactory solution to the problem.
It does so because it provides a realistic three-part test of promise,
action-in-reliance, and the avoidance of injustice by which to measure
the need for imposing liability for a gratuitous promise. 56 In the charitable subscription cases scarcely any question is ever raised as to whether
the defendant actually made a promise of a future gift to the charity.
Indeed, there is practically always available a subscription blank stating
the s1:1m which defendant will give. Again, there is ordinarily no
question but that there is reliance on the promise,57 for the charity
has done exactly the things it said it would do when it accepted the
subscriber's pledge-it has erected buildings, or awarded contracts, or
borrowed money, or continued operations and incurred liabilities. So
far as the factor of the avoidance of injustice is concerned, it, too, is
usually present in these cases. Ordinarily the injustice which will
result to the promisee if there is nonenforcement is apparent; buildings
must be paid for, obligations must be met. If the promisor does not
provide the means, the promisee will have to do so. And, as between
the one who induced the reliance and the one who relied, it is only
fair that the promisor be held liable.
One must recognize that there is pressure on the courts to
uphold such subscriptions. The charity operates for a laudable purpose
and ·with public approval. To give charitable subscriptions special
standing is not objectionable. But, need that be done? Rather, does
not promissory estoppel indicate a way in. which a discriminating choice
can be made between those charitable subscriptions which may justifiably be enforced and those which need not be so regarded?
Promissory estoppel probably received its first open recognition
in connection with the enforcement of the charitable subscription.
Certainly, many apt illustrations are to be found in this compartment of
precedents. The hardship which will be caused the promisee by nonenforcement is quite generally ascertainable in these cases. And,
usually, there is no difficulty in discovering the justifiable action
which the promisee took in reliance upon the gift-promise. Nor is the
55 Note, 27 MICH. L. RBv. 88 at 89 (1928).
56 A detailed analysis of the test is described in

Boyer, "Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine," 98 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 459 (1950).
57 If there has been no detrimental action-in-reliance on the promise, that factor is
missing from the formula and the gift-promise is not enforced. See, for example, Trustees
of Foxcroft Academy v. Favor, 4 Me. 382 (1826) (enforcement of gratuitous gift-promise
refused because the trustees had not spent money in reliance on the subscription); Wesleyan
University v. Hubbard, 124 W.Va. 434, 20 S.E. (2d) 677 (1942); Floyd v. Christian
Church Widows and Orphans Home, 296 Ky. 196, 176 S.W. (2d) 125 (1942).
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nature of the promise itself ignored. With all of these elements present, it is easy to see why the charitable subscription cases afforded a
ready medium for the express formulation and enunciation of the
promissory estoppel doctrine. Enforcement of the promised gift to
charity shows the problems which courts must decide if reliance on a
promise, rather than purchase for a price, is accepted as a measure of
contractual liability.

B.

Parol Promises to Give Land

A parent says to his child, " I now give you Blackacre. It is yours."
The child takes possession and makes improvements.58 The parent
never delivers a deed. Who now owns Blackacre?
To answer this question requires a consideration of the Statute
of Frauds,59 and a preliminary discussion of oral contracts to convey
land as distinguished from oral promises to make gifts of real estate.
An expressed desire to prevent "many fraudulent practices which are
commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of
perjury" is contained in the prefatory recitals of that statute. To
effectuate this desire, the statute details ·many situations in which
written evidence is requirea if claimed rights are to be awarded legal
recognition.
A number of sections of the Statute of Frauds are of concern to
one who seeks to ariswer our hypothetical question: 'Who now owns
Blackacre?" Among them are the following:
"Section I .-All leases, estates, interests of freehold or terms
of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, or out of any ... lands,
58 Evenson v. Aamodt, 153 Minn. 14, 189 N.W. 584 (1922); Clancy v. Flusky, 187
Ill. 605, 58 N.E. 594 (1900); Royer v. Borough of Ephrata, 171 Pa. 429, 33 A. 361
(1895); Dazier v. Matson, 94 Mo. 328, 7 S.W. 268 (1888); Hardesty v. Richardson, 44
Md. 617, 22 Am. Rep. 57 (1876); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870); Kurtz v.
Hibner, 55 Ill. 514 (1870); Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); and
Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882), are among the illustrative cases. See also CHAFEE
AND SIMPSON, CAsEs ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 1156-1159 (1934).
59 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677). The modem English statute is the Law of Property Act
1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §40. Section 178 of the Restatement contains the substance of §4
of the statute. Typical American statutes include Georgia Code of 1933, §20-401; Iowa
Code of 1935, §11285; New York Real Property Law, §259; West Virginia Code of 1937,
§3523; Mo. Rev. Stat., 1939, §3354. Generally speaking, the American statutes are of
two types: those that declare the contract void when the written memorandum is missing,
and those that provide that no action shall be brought in its absence. GLENN AND REDDEN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 541 (1946); CHAFEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY,
2d ed., 547 (1946). Pomeroy says, "In many of the states .•• the legislatures ••• have declared the contracts specified by the statute to be void unless written. Except in one or two
states, however, this change in the phraseology has produced no important change in the
judicial interpretation of the provision." Por.rnnoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS,
3d ed., §70, N. (1) (1926).
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tenements, or hereditaments, made or created by livery and seisin
only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties
so making or creating the same ... shall have the force and effect
of leases or estates at will only, and shall not, either in law or
equity, be deemed to have any other or greater force or effect; any
consideration for making any such parol leases or estates, or any
former law or usage, to the contrary notwithstanding.
"Section 3.-And, moreover, that no leases, estates or interests, either of freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interests
... of, in, to, or out of any ... lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
shall be assigned, granted, or surrendered, unless it be by deed or
note in writing signed by the party so assigning, granting or surrendering the same ... or by act and operation of law.
"Section 4.-No action shall be brought ... 4, or upon any
contract or sale of lands ... or any interest in or concerning them,
. . . unless the agreement upon which such action shall be
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing,
and signed by the party to be charged therewith. . . ."

These sections of the statute, read together, seem to provide a
comprehensive regulation of the manner in which the interests and
estates enumerated can be created.60 And the first section, in particular,
indicates clearly that the statute is to apply in equity as well as at law.
But let us return to our hypothetical case. If it is to be solved by
a literal application of the Statute of Frauds, our problem is answered
-the parent, not the child, has title to Blackacre. There was no writing;
there are only words accompanied by possession and the making of
improvements. It might be urged that section 4 of the Statute of
Frauds does not apply to a parol gift of land. That section says that
"no action shall be brought upon any contract or sale of lands" unless
there is a writing. If the action is not upon a contract (and, obviously,
it is not, for the transaction is here assumed to be a gi~), then the
prohibition of the section would not bar the proceedings. However,
this argument will not apply when the first and third sections of the
Statute of Frauds are invoked. These sections purport to prescribe
the way in which interests in land shall be created, whether by bargain,
gift, or otherwise, that is, by deed or writing. Since, in our hypothetical
case, there is no deed or writing creating an estate in the child, it would
·seem that, at best, his interest in Blackacre is no more than an estate at
will. Such is not the case. Many courts will hold that the child who
60 BnoWNE, STATUTE OF

FRAUDS §437 (5th ed., Bailey, 1895).
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has coupled possession of the realty with the making of substantial
improvements upon land given to him orally acquires title.61
Such rulings result from the application by analogy of the equitable
doctrine of part performance. Under this doctrine the Chancellor came
to treat instances of performance in reliance on an oral contract as an
exception to the statute, considering that he should ameliorate many of
the inequitable hardships which would follow· from its strict application. 62 Equity has always possessed the power of preventing fraud
and relieving against it. Hence, the Chancellor did not hesitate to
compel specific performance of a contract within the Statute of
Frauds if "refusal to execute it would amount to practicing a fraud." 63
If there has been sufficient part performance under the contract, the
court of equity accepts that as the equivalent of the writing required
by the Statute of Frauds.64
As to what will amount to sufficient part performance of a contract to remove the bar of the statute, however, the courts differ widely. 65 Four states refuse to recognize any part performance as a substitute
for the writing required by the Statute of Frauds. 66 Save for them, the
English, as well as the American cases, recognize the efficacy of some
kind of part performance in taking an oral contract for the conveyance
of land out of the statute. 67
Thus far the discussion has been of instances where there actually
was either an exchange of oral promises between the parties or the
61 Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882). For cases in accord with Seavey v. Drake,
see I AMEs, A SELEC'IlON OF CAsEs IN EQUITY JURismcnoN 309, note 11 (1904). In
Irwin v. Dyke, 114 ill. 302 at 306, I N.E. 913 (1885), Judge Sheldon said, "We think
this brings the case within the rule of repeated decisions of this court, that where a father
makes a verbal agreement with a son to convey to him a tract of land if the latter will go
and live on the same, make expenditures upon and improve it, and this is done in reliance
upon the promise, a court of equity will enforce a specific performance of the agreement."
Contra: Forward v. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124 (1847); Pinckard v. Pinckard's Heirs, 23
Ala. 649 (1853); Usher's Exr. v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552 (1886); Ridley and Wife v. McNairy,
2 Humph. 174 (Tenn. 1840).
02 McCLINTocx, EQUITY §55 (1936); WALsH, EQUITY §79 (1930). An excellent
discussion of the theory is given by Pound, "Progress of the Law-Equity," 33 HAnv. L.
RBv. 929 at 933-949 (1920).
63 BROWNE, STATUTE oF FRAUDS §437 (5th ed., Bailey, 1895).
6 4 McCLINTocK, EQUITY §56 (1936); WILLISTON, §494; CONTRACTS REsTATBMBNT,
§197.
65 As to the sufficiency, see CHAFEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 1111
(1934) for an elaborate note on possession, payment and improvements as part performance in the United States.
66 These four states are Kentucky [Grant v. Craigmiles, I Bibb 203 (1808)], Mississippi [Beaman v. Buck, 17 Sm. & M. 207 (1848)], North Carolina [Albea v. Griffin, 22
N.C. 9 (1838)], and Tennessee [Patton v. McClure, Mart & Yerg 333 (1828)]. See
POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3d ed., §97 (1926), for a complete collection of the
cases.
67See CHAFBB AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 1111 (1934) for the citation
of authorities.
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performance of an act by the promisee at the oral request of the
promisor and in return for his promise. In such a situation the only
problem which confronts the court is the application of the Statute of
Frauds. The question for decision is whether anything less than a
writing "signed by the party so assigning, granting or surrendering"
an interest in realty will suffice in inducing the court to enforce the
promise. Those courts which recognize the doctrine of part performance answer the question in the affirmative. 68
But will an oral promise to give land be enforced? Here,. in contradistinction to the cases just considered, the promisor has not sought anything in return for his promise. He is not trying to make a contract.
Rather, he has indicated his intention to bestow something in the future
on the promisee. Any court which declares such a gratuitous promise
binding must clear a double hurdle; it must find consideration ( or
its equivalent), and it must discover the requisite ceremony to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.
Some courts do enforce such gratuitous parol promises. When
they do, they clear the barrier raised by the Statute of Frauds by exactly the same means which are used in cases of oral contracts to convey.
A performance which would be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds in the case of an oral contract to sell will also meet its requirements when the promise is to make a gift of realty. So, if the promisee,
in reliance on the promise, has taken possession of the premises and
made substantial improvements, he will usually be protected; and the
promise is enforced.69
There yet remains the second hurdle-the lack of a bargained-for
exchange. It is cleared by any one of at least three methods. Some
courts regard such a promise, when accompanied by possession and improvements, as analogous to an executed gift. A second solution is to
find that taking possession and making improvements is, in equity,
sufficient "consideration" for the promise. A third solution enforces
68 McCLINTocx, EQUITY §55 (1936): "In four of the states (Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and Tennessee) the doctrine of part performance is rejected in its entirety.
In the other states it is adopted, but with great difference in the decisions as to what will
amount to part performance." Accord: WALSH, EQUITY §79 (1930). HANDLER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE I.Aw OF VENDOR AND PtmCHASER 27-30 (1933) has a splendid
discussion of the problem.
69 Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241 P. 797 (1925); Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94
N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922), affd. 96 N.J. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924); Seavey v.
Drake, 62 N.H. 393 at 394 (1882) (''Equity protects a parol gift of land equally with a
parol agreement to sell it, if accompanied by possession, and the donee has made valuable
improvements upon the property induced by the promise to give it. • • • There is no important distinction in this respect between a promise to give and a promise to sell"); Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930).
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the promise by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Let us
consider these solutions in turn.

I. The Gi~ Analogy. An oft-quoted case70 states that, "a gift
may be defined as a voluntary transfer of his property by one to another,
without any consideration or compensation therefor." Naturally, the
owner of personal property may give it to some one; so may the owner
of real property. As a well known authority on the subject points out,
however, "... the law concerning transfers of real and personal property
has developed along entirely different lines."71
In the realm of personal property, for a gift to be effective there
"are three general requisites. The first of these is that there must be
either a deed by the donor transferring the property in question, or in
the more common case of the parol gift, a delivery of the subject
matter by the donor to the donee, or some other act or course of conduct
on the part of the donor, which is accepted by the courts as equivalent
thereto. The second requirement is that the donor must possess an
intent to give. And the third is that the donee must accept."72 Of
these three elements (delivery, intent to give, and acceptance), the
greatest emphasis has been placed upon the first-delivery. 73
As Professor Philip Mechem has pointed out in his article on the
subject,74 the requirement o~ delivery serves a useful threefold purpose: (I) the manual tradition (handing over) of the object makes
the donor aware of what he is doing; (2) the handing over "is as
unequivocal to actual witnesses of the transaction as to the donor himself," and (3) " ... the fact of delivery gives the donee, subsequently
to the act, at least prima facie evidence in favor of the alleged gift." 711
Delivery of the chattel (or its equivalent), then, has come to be re10 Gray

v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68 at 72, 14 Am. Rep. 181 "(1873).

71 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §37 (1936).
72 BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §37 (1936). Accord: ScHOULER, PERSONAL PROP·
ERTY, 5th ed., §87 (1918).
78 Note, 20 CoL, L. REv. 196 (1920): "The emphasis placed on delivery in effecting

the transfer of a chattel by gift is directly traceable to the notion in early law, of seisin as
an element in the ownership of chattels as well as of land. To transfer ownership by gift
it was necessary to vest the donee with seisin. But if this were accomplished by any of the
various devices known to the law and there was the intention to make the donation, the
gift became complete [upon acceptance]."
74 Mechem, "The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments," 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 457, 568 (1926,
1927).
711 Id. at 348-349. Parenthetically, one may observe that the manual tradition of the
chattel, standing alone, is not exclusively indicative of gift. It is equally consistent with
bailment or pledge. In contrast, the handing over of "the twig or bit of earth" that accompanied feoffment could ordinarily have had only one meaning to an on-looker.
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quired if a gift of it is to be effective. Absent delivery of the chattel
itself, or of a deed to it, there is no gift.76
As indicated above, some courts enforce gratuitous oral promises
to make gifts of realty upon a theory which treats the relied-upon
promise as analogous to an executed gift. 77 In Evenson v. Aamodt,78
for example, the court said, "To constitute a valid transfer of land by
verbal gift, there must be a gift completely executed by delivery of
possession and performance of some acts sufficient to take the case
out of the statute of frauds: The performance necessary for this purpose must be an acceptance, a taking of possession under and in reliance
upon the gift and the doing of such acts in reliance thereon that it
would work a substantial injustice to hold the gift void."79 Since there
had been a delivery of possession and the substantial expenditure of
money in reliance upon the promise, the court held the gift effective.
Likewise in 'f1.oberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks80 the court expressly
relied upon the executed gift analogy saying, "The transaction was a
gift pure and simple, and ... is enforceable in equity. A parol gift of
land is invalid, but when the gift is accompanied by possession, and the
donee has been induced by the promise of the gift to make valuable
improvements of a permanent nature, equity will enforce it." Here
the application of the theory is made dependent expressly upon the
analogies found in the cases dealing with gifts of chattels.
Some courts which do not employ the gift analogy directly do so
by implication; they require that the gratuitous promise contemplate
a present (not a future) gift.81 It is to be noted that before the promise
76 Id. at 569.
77 In re Allshouse's

Estate, 304 Pa. 481, 156 A. 69 (1931): ''To make a valid gift
[of personalty] there must be a clear, satisfactory and unmistakable intention .•. to surrender dominion over the subject of the gift with an intention to invest donee with the right
of disposition beyond recall, accompanied by irrevocable delivery, actual or constructive.' •.•
Where the gift is of real property the same rules apply: There must be an unmistakable
intention to .•• surrender complete dominion over the premises, accompanied by an intention to invest the donee with the right of disposition, followed by an irrevocable delivery..••
If there is no such delivery of a deed, then the gift is incomplete.•.. An exception to this
rule is that of a parol gift of real property, to· which the statute of frauds is held to be no
bar to enforcement if the donee has taken possession of the land and made improvements
on it.'' WILLISTON, §139; McCLINToCK, EQmTY §57 (1936).
78

153 Minn. 14, 189 N.W. 584 (1922).

79Id. at 17. Emphasis supplied.
80 94 N.J. Eq. 82 at 84, 118 A. 275 (1922).
81 Prior v. Newsom, 144 Ark. 593 at 597, 223 S.yV. 21 (192-0) ("An instruction
given to the jury correctly declared the law to be that there could be no valid parol gift
unless there was a present conveyance, that is, a conveyance made with the intention that
it take effect at once, and not at a future time. . . . [T]here was, therefore, no perfected
gift under which the title could and did pass"); Burris v. Landers, 114 Cal. 310 at 313314, 46 P. 162 (1896)) ("It is an effort simply to enforce a promise to make a gift. . . .
[W]here a parol gift of real estate is made in praesenti, and the donee has entered . . • and
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is considered binding, the donee must, at the very least, have gone
into possession under the parol gift.82
But the courts which say they enforce the promises on the same
theory that applies to gifts of personal property require more than a
mere taking of possession on the strength of the oral promise. The
almost universal holding is that there must have been "valuable improvements" made by the donee in addition to possession taken.88 If
the personal property analogy fully applied, possession would be
enough. The emphasis which is placed on the analogy of gift seems to
remove the problem of consideration from these cases. The holding
that the transfer of possession accompanied by substantial improvements is equivalent to an executed gift appears to avoid any requirement
that the court discover a bargained-for equivalent as a reason for enforcing the promise. It can consider that title has passed. But saying that
there has been a gift does not make it so. Indeed, one may well incline
to the belief that these courts believe themselves confronted by hard
cases; seeking a just solution they strain to find it in an inept analogy
that is not even accurately applied.
The grounds stated for these decisions are objectionable. They
overlook the formalities which have always characterized the transfers
of interests in land and which the Statute of Frauds emphasized when
it required a writing.84
Despite the objections which may be made to the reasoning of
this line of cases, there is merit to be found in their result. The merit
is in the court's desire to avoid injustice to a donee who in reliance
upon the promised gift has taken possession of realty and made substantial improvements of a permanent character thereon. On a purely
has made ••• improvements •••, equity will ... lend its assistance to the perfection of the
donee's title"); Hagerty v. Hagerty, 186 Iowa 1329 at 1333, 172 N.W. 259 (1919) ("There
must be proof of intent to make a present gift. • • • A gift, to be effectual, must be fully
executed •••"); Bigelow v. Bigelow, 93 Me. 439 at 451, 45 A. 513 (1900) (''The promise
•.. must be regarded merely as a voluntary executory promise to make a gift in the future.
Such a promise, so long as it remains unexecuted, can not ordinarily be enforced").
82 Not a single instance has been found, among the many cases examined, in which a
donee who had not taken possession was declared to be the owner of the realty allegedly
given him. McCLINTocK, EQUITY ·§57 (1936).
83 Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 1 at 9-10, 19 L.Ed. 590 (1869) ("And equity
protects a parol gift of land, equally with a parol agreement to sell it, if accompanied by
possession, and the donee, induced by the promise to give it, has made valuable improvements on the property''). Accord: Akins v. Heiden, 177 Ark. 392, 7 S.W. (2d) 15 (1928);
Bevington v. Bevington, 133 Iowa 351, 110 N.W. 840 (1907); Evenson v. Aamodt, 153
Minn. 14, 189 N.W. 584 (1922); Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A.
275 (1922); In re Allshouse's Estate, 304 Pa. 481, 156 A. 69 (1931); Davis et ux. v.
Douglas, (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) 15 S.W. (2d) 232; Reid v. Reid, 115 Okla. 58, 241
P. 797 (1925); Young v. Overbaugh, 145 N.Y. 158, 39 N.E. 712 (1895).
84 BnoWNI!, STATUTE OP FRAUDS §491a (5th ed., Bailey, 1895).
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ethical basis, if no other, one may applaud the ruling. And it is in the
generalized rule which one may develop from these cases that one finds
some of the precedents that go to make up the present-day doctrine of
promissory estoppel.

2. The Finding of Consideration. A second solution to the
problem of the justification for enforcing an oral promise to give land
is found in the decision of those courts which hold that the act of
taking possession coupled with the making of substantial improvements constitute, in equity, sufficient consideration for the promise.85
A typical illustration of this class of decisions is Lindell v. Lindell. 86
There a son, in reliance upon his father's promise to give him a farm,
took possession of it and erected thereon a house, granary, barn and
fences. When the son died, the father brought ejectment. The court
said, "A parol promise by an owner to give land to another either by
deed or will accompanied by actual delivery of possession, becomes an
enforceable promise, when the promisee induced thereby has made
substantial improvements upon the premises with knowledge of the
promisor. The promise to give is no longer nudum pactum. It has
become a promise upon a consideration.')81
Another court reacted similarly when it held that the promise
to make the gift, when accompanied by improvements made in reliance
thereon was not a mere naked promise, but was supported by consideration. The expenditure was tantamount to the payment of consideration.88 And these are not the only examples of this type of solution
to the problem of how to enforce the gratuitous promise to give real
estate.89
What is there in this situation which makes the action-in-reliance
by the promisee a "consideration"; what induces the court to enforce
the promise? If the definition of consideration adopted by the American
Law Institute is accepted,90 it is clear that the acts of the promisee are
85 Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N.Y. 327 (1867) (reversed on other grounds); Kurtz v. Hibner,
55 III. 514 (1870); Bright v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97 (1866); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34, 3
Am. Rep. 657 (1870); Paxton v. Paxton, 28 Mich. 159 (1873); Clancy v. Flusky, 187 Ill.
605, 58 N.E. 594 (1900); Lindell v. Lindell, 135 Minn. 368, 160 N.W. 1031 (1917).
86135 Minn. 368, 160 N.W. 1031 (1917).
87 Jd. at 371. Emphasis supplied.
ss Whitsitt v. Trustees of Preemption Presbyterian Church, 110 Ill. 125 at 131 (1884).
89For similar holdings, see Guynn v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97 at 116 (1877) ("Chancery will not decree • • • performance of a mere voluntary agreement, yet where a donee
enters into possession • • • and makes valuable improvements on the land on the faith of
the gift it constitutes a consideration on which to ground a claim for specific performance");
Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 III. 514 at 521, 8 Am. Rep. 665 (1870) ("Such a promise rests upon
a valuable consideration. The promisee acts upon the faith of the promise. We can perceive
no important distinction between such a promise and a sale").
90 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §75; see footnotes 14 and 16 supra.
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not consideration. They were not "bargained for and given in exchange
for the promise," because the parties certainly did not understand that
the specific action of the promisee was to be rendered in payment
for the promise.91 Indeed, as Justice Holmes observed, these acts of
the promisee "would seem to be no more than conditions or natural
consequences of the promise."92 If the parties did not bargain, what
justifies the court in holding that they did?
When courts hold (as they do when they solve the problem by this
second method) that the promisee's acts of taking possession and
making substantial improvements constitute a consideration, they are
subject to criticism. A court which so decides deals with the fact
situation on the assumption that there is a bargain involved. In truth,
the parties did not strike a bargaU1-! Actually, the promisor was trying
to (or at least said he would) make a gift-but failed to go through the
legal forms requisite to the accomplishment of his intent. Why, then,
speak in terms of bargain?
In determining the question of title as between promisor and
promisee-actually, that is the ultimate question in these cases-a
court might well hold that promises to make gifts of realty, when followed by possession and substantial improvements in reliance on the
promise, are the equivalent of a completely executed gift. As indicated
above,98 some courts so rule. To hold instead that they are bargains
which have been bought and paid for is to misinterpret the facts. So
to rule is to twist the concept of bargain out of its proper setting.
In contrast to such holdings, as will be pointed out, the doctrine
of promissory estoppel aids the court in determining whether a gratuitous promise should be enforced. It does this without resort to
such fictions as finding a "consideration" in what is but compliance
with a condition and without trying to force what was plainly a benefaction into the mold of a bargain.
Whether a court is justified in vesting title to the promised land in
the promisee depends upon whether the promise has caused such a
radical and detrimental change of position by the promisee that reason
and fairness demand that the promise be enforced. To this writer, at
least, it seems that the result reached is more in accord with the theory
of promissory estoppel than with any other. And it would be preferable
for the court to justify it on that basis. Certainly he would not accept
01 McGovern v. City of New York, 234 N.Y. 377 at 388, 138 N.E. 26 (1923),
''Nothing is consideration • • • that is not regarded as such by both parties." One should
add-"and so regarded in advance."
92Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114 at 117, 60 N.E. 397 (1901).
98 See discussion on pages 657 to 660 supra.
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without cnt:Ic1sm a rationalization which says "expenditures made
upon permanent improvements upon land with the knowledge of the
owner, induced by his promise, made to the party making the expenditure, to give the land to such party, constitute in equity a consideration
for the promise."94
3. Promissory Estoppel As An Explanation. There is a third
way in which courts may surmount the obstacle presented by the fact
that nothing has been given in exchange for a parol promise to make
a gift of land. That way is to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
This one court did in Greiner 11. Greiner. 95
In that case a son, in reliance on his mother's promise to give him
eighty acres of land, gave up a homestead in another county, moved
onto the designated land with his family, "made lasting and valuable
improvements and other expenditures and lived on the land for nearly
a year. Then his mother served notice on him to quit." She next
brought an action for forcible detention to which the son countered
with a request that she be ordered to convey the land to him. The
trial court gave the son the relief sought; on appeal the Supreme Court
of Kansas affirmed. Justice Burch who wrote the opinion was content
to quote section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts and (after summarizing the evidence) to add, " ... this court cannot say it would not
be unjust to deny him a deed and to put him off [the land], and cannot
say a money judgment would afford him adequate relief." 96
The detrimental reliance of the promisee was considered as sufficient, when coupled with the elements of justifiable action and
hardship, to cause the court to enforce the oral promise to make a gift
of realty. A money judgment would not compensate him for the
changes which had occurred in his plan of life. Injustice could be
avoided only by enforcement.
There are at least three ways, then, by which courts overcome
the objection of lack of consideration in cases involving an oral promise
to make a gift of land. Some judges say that consideration is not required because the transaction is a gift, not a bargain; others, resorting
to fiction, say that the acts of the promisee (though not bargained for as
the price for a promise) furnish consideration; still other judges find
a solution in the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
One may question, however, whether it is always necessary in
94 Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 at
95 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930).
96 Id. at 765. It is worth noting that

39, 3 Am. Rep. 657 (1870).

Justice Burch became a member of the Coun•
cil of the American Law Institute in 1924 and so served until 1942. 2 PROCEEDINGS
A.L.I. 83 (1924) and 19 A.LI. PROCEEDINGS 2 (1941-42).
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these cases for the court to declare title to the realty to be vested in the
promisee. Could injustice have been avoided by the use of other legal
devices?97 Might not the courts have held that restitution, such as
would be given by reimbursement for the cost or value,98 should be
the relief normally afforded to the promisee who in reliance upon such
a promise has made substantial improvements?99 In many instances
the courts would be justified in adopting such a remedy instead of
requiring specific performance of the promise. However, when the
court does decide to give relief to the gratuitous promisee, performance
of the promise seems to be the usual remedy awarded. For this, any
one of three reasons may be advanced.
First, it is a matter of common observation that the courts, having
solved the substantive law problem, are inclined to treat questions of the
relief to be afforded as mere details of procedure.100 Second, the courts
may not have been aware of restitution as an alternate remedy. Third,
they may have been motivated by the fact that the claimant was a
meritorious object of the promisor's bounty (as where he was a close
relative), and have believed that no harm would be done by enforcing
the promise. This latter factor may have great weight where the
promisor has died and the claim is against his estate. Unfortunately,
in many of the cases considered in this section the degree of kinship
existing between the promisor and the promisee does not appear.
Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether this third reason is a
valid explanation of why performance was required rather than restitution awarded to the promisee. Incidentally, such instances illustrate
one of the weaknesses of the Oliphant theory of ratio decidendi; courts
do not always articulate in their opinions the facts which they regard
as legally relevant.
In support of the tendency to require performance of the promise
rather than to give the promisee reimbursement, it may be argued
that enforcement of the promise, not just restoration of the status quo, is
97 See discussion in Boyer, ''Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of
the Doctrine," 98 Umv. PA. L. Rllv. 459 at 482-494 (1950).
98 For example, see Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909) (builder
permitted to recover the fair value of what was furnished, not restricted to the improvement
value).
99 Restitution equal to the value of improvements made by the donee has been allowed
in North Carolina [Carter v. Carter, 182 N.C. 186, 108 S.E. 765 (1921)] and in Kentucky [Usher's Executor v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552 (1886)]. See, Fuller and Perdue, ''The
Reliance Element in Contract Damages: 2," 46 YALB L. J. 373, 405 (1937); WALSH,
EQUITY §79 (1930). In Griffin v. Griffin, 206 Ala. 489, 90 S. 907 (1921), the court
refused to enforce the oral promise to give land but did allow compensation for the improvements.
100 Patterson, ''Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract," 31 CoL. L.
Rllv. 1286 (1931).

664

MrcmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

the normal remedy in equity.101 Indeed, since specific enforcement
satisfies the expectations which have been aroused justifiably, there
is additional reason for granting it. Of the three explanations given
for the enforcement (despite the Statute of Frauds) of parol promises to
give land, only the third (promissory estoppel) involves an extension
of contract beyond the bargain concept.
Unless the promisee has acquired a possession which unequivocally
evidences a promise to transfer the title and has also made substantial
improvements, he usually will be denied relief. An examination of
several cases emphasizing this problem may serve to indicate how
promissory estoppel can assist in the development of our contract law.
In Burns v. McCormick,1° 2 for example, the plaintiffs gave up
their business in another town, moved into the home of the promisor
and cared for him until he died; all this in reliance upon his promise
that they should have the house upon his death. The court in an
opinion by Judge Cardozo, the same judge who five years later wrote
the opinion in the Allegheny College Case,1° 3 denied recovery, because
plaintiffs did not have exclusive possession of the realty promised (the
court said they only lived on it as servants).104
In cases of parol promises to give land, as well as in cases like Burns
v. McCormick (where there was an actual bargain and the receipt of
the consideration requested) insistence, on transfer of possession might
well be dispensed with where there has been a substantial detrimental
change of position in reliance upon the promised gift. The plaintiffs
in Burns v. McCormick as well as the promisee in Greiner v. Greiner,

,

101 WALSH, EQUlTY §79, note 21, p. 404 (1930) "It [enforcement] is the better remedy as it gives the plaintiff the full advantage of his expenditures, not mere restitution."
Accord: 4 A.L.I., PnocBEDINGs, App. 95-96, 98-99, 101-104 (1926) (Mr. Williston:
"Either the promise is binding or it is not. If it is binding, it has to be enforced as it is
made.") But see, Pound, "The Progress of the Law, Equity," 33 HARv. L. REv. 929 at
936 (1920): ''The 'equities' of one who has been put in possession ••. call for making him
whole for what he is out upon the faith of the contract, so far as a court of equity may do
so."
102 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922).
103 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y.
369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
104 Cases enforcing promises to give land in fact situations similar to Bums v. McCormick include the following: Mannix v. Baumgardner, 184 Md. 600, 42 A. (2d) 124
(1945); Evans v. Buchanan, 183 Md. 463, 38 A. (2d) 81 (1944); Bryson et ux. v. McShane, 48 W.Va. 126, 35 S.E. 848 (1900). It should be noted that one state, Virginia,
has enacted a statute to cover this situation. Va. Code of 1942 (Michie) §5141, provides
" ••. nor shall any right to a conveyance of any such estate or term in land accrue to the
donee of the land or those claiming under him, under a gift or promise of gift of the same
hereafter made and not in writing, although such gift or promise be followed by possession
thereunder and improvement of the land by the donee or those claiming under him."
Prior to the enactment of this statute in 1887, Virginia enforced such oral promises to
make gifts. Mann v. Mann, 159 Va. 240, 165 S.E. 522 (1932); GLBNN AND Rm>Dl!N,
CASBS ON EQUlTY 571-572 (1946).
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changed their ways of life. ·That one found the change accompanied
by possession of the promised realty while the other did not seems to
have been merely fortuitous. From an ethical viewpoint, that circumstance (of sole possession) alone does not seem sufficient to justify the
reaching of opposite results. The proper e~ployment of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel would require more attention to the problem
of injustice and less to formalities.
The foregoing review of cases enforcing oral gratuitous promises
to make gifts of land provides numerous precedents for the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Perhaps it will be appropriate to review their
contribution to its elements.
In all of the cases there is a promise to give land. Was it of such
a nature that the promisor should reasonably expect the promise to
induce action of a definite and substantial character by the promisee?
Certainly the promisor has every reason to expect that the promisee will
do something with the land he has been told is his. One should not expect the· donee to let the land lie fallow. Cultivation and improvement
of realty is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the promise. Nor
can there be any doubt that the expenditures of time and money were
made in reliance on the gift-promise. Thus, the first two elements of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel (the promise and action-in-reliance
on it) are clearly present. How about the third element: avoiding
'injustice only by enforcement?
Here there is more difficulty, for often the court could award
a money judgment which would reimburse the promisee for his outof-pocket expenditures as well as his time and effort. But the cases
do not usually adopt such a procedure. Instead, they either award the
promisee his expectations (enforcing the promise in its entirety) or
allow him nothing.105 Courts generally take the view that whenever
injustice to the promisee is serious enough to warrant relief, he should
receive all that he reasonably expected.
From the viewpoint of Oliphant, one is justified in stating that all
of the instances in which such promises are enforced are precedents
for the doctrine. Explicit recognition of the doctrine as a justifiable
and reasonable basis for judgment and decision permits the use of these
precedents in a synthesis from which an effective and workable principle emerges.
C. Gratuitous Bailments
Plaintiff being indebted to J. S. "delivered ten pounds to the
105for a detailed discussion of the alternatives to these two solutions, see Boyer, "Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine," 98 Umv. PA. L. REv.
459 at 482-494 (1950).
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defendant, to the intent he should pay it to J. S. in part of payment
sine ulla mora; that in consideratione inde the dependant assumed, &c.
and assigns for breach, that he had not paid."106 In King's Bench it
was argued that there was no consideration for "it is not alleged that
he delivered it unto the defendant upon his request"; the acceptance
was of no benefit to the defendant, so it was said. But the court refused
to arrest the judgment for "he accepted this money to deliver, and
promised to deliver it" so it was a good consideration to charge the
defendant.
Wheatley 11. Low was decided in 1623, yet the reasoning which
decided that case could be applied with almost equal force to a judgment rendered in 1923.107 In Siegel 11. Spear and Co. plaintiff sued
to recover for a loss suffered when his furniture which had been stored
in defendant's warehouse was destroyed by fire. The crucial facts
were that plaintiff desired to store his furniture and that defendant's
agent promised to keep it free of charge. In the conversation the agent
discovered that plaintiff carried no insurance and said, "I will do it
for you; it will be a good deal cheaper; I handle lots of insurance;
when you get the next bill [for installment payments still due defendant
on the furniture which ·had been purchased from it] you can send a
check for that [the insurance premium] with the next installment."108
The furniture was then sent to defendant's warehouse. About a
month later it was destroyed by fire. No insurance had been placed on
it.
The court held that defendant was liable for the loss, saying,
"defendant undertook to store the plaintiff's property without any
compensation .... the promise [to insure] ... was linked up with the
gratuitous bailment . . . . It was after his statements and promises that
the plaintiff sent the furniture to the storehouse .... The defendant ...
entered up~n execution of the trust . ... As Chancellor Kent said in
referring to the earlier cases: '... an action on the case lay for a misfeasance, in a breach of trust undertaken voluntarily.' From this aspect
of the case we think there was a consideration for the agreement to
insure."100
The court seems to rest its decision upon two grounds-first, that
defendant had entered upon execution of the trust and, second, that
106 Wheatley v. Low,
101 Siegel v. Spear &
REV.

573 (1923).

·

108 Siegel v. Spear
109 Id. at 482-483.

ll8 P. 459 (19ll).

Cro. Jae. 668, 79 Eng. Rep. 578 (1623).
Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923). Noted 23 CoL. L.

& Co., 234 N.Y. 479 at 481 (1923).
Emphasis added. Accord: Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443,
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there was consideration for the promise. The second of these reasons
attempts to place the transaction in a bargain context. It considers
that the surrender of the goods on the strength of the promise constituted an exchange for it. No one will deny that the surrender of
the furniture could be made the basis for a bargain. But, on the facts,
it was not. Indeed, that surrender could he a legal detriment (promisee
was under no duty to store with the defendant), but here it actually
secured an economic benefit for the plaintiff. By the transaction he
obtained a place to store his goods while he was on vacation. There
was, at the most, a gratuitous promise to store and secure an insurance
policy on the goods. There was no bargain and exchange, for the defendant was not to be paid for the promise to secure the insurance.
It may be argued that plaintiff's promise to pay the insurance
premiums was the bargained-for exchange for the clerk's promise to
procure the insurance. If it was, then the case can be supported on
straight contract theory. Such construction seems strained, however.
There actually was no "bargain" of a promise for a promise. The case
can, however, be supported on a theory of promissory estoppel.
When the court argues that the defendant is liable because it
"had entered upon the execution of the trust" it is on firmer ground.
Under that argument liability is imposed because defendant, after he
undertook (or began) to perform a task, performed it badly. Such an
approach places the case in the category of gratuitous bailments.110
The leading case in the field of gratuitous bailments is Coggs v.
Bernard.111 There the plaintiff delivered a cask of brandy to defendant,
a carter. Defendant, in turn, was to transport the brandy to a third
party. The carter was to receive no compensation and promised to
carry the liquor carefully. Through his neglect, the wine was spilled.
Because the case was thought to be important, it was argued before
the whole court. Holt, C. J., in the course of his opinion said that
when he [the promisee] intrusts the bailee upon his undertaking to
''be careful, he has put a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent,
his pretence of care being the persuasion that induced the plaintiff to
trust him. And a breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily will be a good
ground for an action . . . . The owner's trusting him with the goods
is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management.
110 In Siegel v. Spear & Co. it does not appear that defendant's agent was to receive
any commission on the insurance he was to secure for the plaintiff. Apparently the check
which plaintiff was to send was to cover his monthly installment payment and the insur•
ance premium. No part of the insurance premium was to go to defendant or to its clerk
who made the gratuitous promise. Hence, the case should not be interpreted as the ex•
change of a promise to pay for a promise to store and insure.
m 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
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Indeed, if the agreement had'been executory, to carry these brandies
from the one place to the other such a day, the defendant had not been
bound to carry them. But this is a different case, for assumpsit does
not only signify a future agreement, but in such a case as this, it signifies
an actual entry upon the thing, and taking the trust upon himself.
And if a man will do that, and miscarries in the performance of his
trust, an action will lie against him for that, though nobody could have
compelled him to do the thing . . . . And so a bare being trusted with
another man's goods, must be taken to be a sufficient consideration,
if the bailee once enter upon the trust, and take the goods into his
possession. "112
All of the justices agreed in giving judgment for the plaintiff.
Gould, J., said, " . . . the reason of the action is, the particular trust
reposed in the defendant, to which he has concurred by his assumption,
and in the executing which has miscarried by his neglect." Powell,
J., found the gist of these actions to be the undertaking, saying, ". . .
when I have reposed a trust in you, upon your undertaking, if I suffer,
when I have so relied upon you, I shall have my action."
While it might appear that the action should be in tort for negligence, the court approved of recovery in assumpsit and upon the
undertaking. Some writers explain the case by saying that since the
promisor failed to carry the brandy safely, as he had agreed, a species
of deceit had been practiced on the defendant, though this is not
acceptable.11 3
Here the carter had promised to use care and had actually begun
the transportation of the brandy casks. Should he respond in damages
if the goods are damaged through his neglect? If he is to be liable,
shall it be in tort or in contract? Since the court believed that the
promise had induced the plaintiff to entrust the goods to the defendant,
the court allowed recovery in assumpsit even though the promise
actually had been gratuitous. Thus it emphasized the origin of the relationship rather than the character of the act which brought about
the injury.
Coggs 11. Bernard did much to establish the English law of bailments;114 it is also a prec_edent for the principle of promissory estoppel.
112 Coggs v.
113 This is

Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 at 919-920, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
the explanation given in BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §80 (1936).
''Deceit'' seems to be as forced an explanation as "trust." Is not the real ground for the
decision the belief that one who actively undertakes, i.e., begins, to do something in relation to another's property is bound to do it carefuly, regardless of whether he has received
pay?
114 Justice Story had an interesting comment on this case: " ••• Lord Holt, with great
sagacity and boldness, led the way to some of the most important improvements by his
celebrated judgment in Coggs v. Bernard, in which the law of bailments is expounded with
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Here all of the elements of the doctrine are present. There is a promise
reasonably expected to and which does induce an injurious reliance
to the detriment of the promisee. Unless the promise is enforced, the
promisee will suffer undue hardship. It is not possible to restore the
status quo; the brandy is lost. It seems more just to make the loss fall
on the promisor. Since the promisee delivered a chattel into the hands
of the defendant, the nature of the reliance is capable of demonstration
and evidences "the particular trust reposed" in the defendant. In
Coggs 11. Bernard the court made it clear that there would have been no
liability if the carter had refused to perform at all.1115 Because of this, it
is authority for those decisions which distinguish between misfeasance
and nonfeasance, imposing liability in the former and denying it in
the latter case.
It is upon this distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance
that Chancellor Kent's opinion in Thorne 11. Deas1 16 turns. There
plaintiff and defendant owned the brig Sea Nymph. On the day the
vessel sailed they talked about insurance and defendant said he would
procure it. Ten days later defendant said they had saved the cost· of
the insurance and plaintiff, indicating that he thought it had already
been obtained, said that if defendant "would not have the insurance
immediately made out, he [plaintiff] would have it effected." Defendant then told plaintiff to "make himself easy," for he [defendant]
would that day apply to the insurance office, and have it done. The
vessel was wrecked; no insurance had been procured. Plaintiff brought
an action on the case for defendant's failure to effect the insurance.
Defendant moved for non-suit on the ground that the promise was
without consideration and void.
Chancellor Kent emphasized the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance by saying, " . . . In other words he is responsible for
a misfeasance, but not for a nonfeasance, even though special damages
are averred . . . . I have no doubt of the perfect justice of the Roman
rule, on the ground, that good faith ought to be observed, because the
philosophical precision and fullness. . •. This branch of the law stands now at the distance
of more than a centw:y on the immovable foundation where this great man placed it, the
foundation of reason and justice." STORY, A DxscotrnsE ON THE PAST HxsTORY, PRESENT
STATE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE LAw 9 (1835).
115 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (I 703) "But if a man undertakes to build a house, without anything to be had for his pains, an action will not lie for
nonperformance, because it is nudum pactum" (p. 909); "An action indeed will not lie for
not doing the thing, for want of a sufficient consideration; but yet if the bailee will take
the goods into his custody, he shall be answerable for them, for the taking the goods into
his custody is his own act'' (p. 911); "Indeed if the agreement had been executory .•. the
defendant had not been bound to carry them" (p. ·919).
11a 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (1809).
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employer, placing reliance upon that good faith in the mandatary, was
thereby prevented from doing the act himself, or employing another
to do it .... But there are many rights of moral obligation which civil
laws do not enforce, and are, therefore, left to the conscience of the
individual, as rights of imperfect obligation; and the promise before
us seems to have been so left by the common law ...."117 The court
gave judgment for the defendant.
·
The chief distinction between Thorne v. Deas and Coggs v.
Bernard seems to be that in the latter case the defendant was actually
entrusted with a chattel when he gave the promise; in the former
nothing was handed over. But there appears to have been as much
reliance on the promise to insure as there was on the promise to carry
safely the brandy casks. Is it not misleading to make the question of
liability depend on whether any chattel was delivered when the promise
was made? Suppose that in Coggs v. Bernard the carter, after the casks
of brandy had been handed to and accepted by him, had failed and
refused to carry them but instead had held them at his warehouse.
Would this be nonfeasance or misfeasance? Regardless of what it is
called, the promisee is doomed. And this writer believes he should
have a remedy.
The casks of brandy in Coggs v. Bernard, the money in Wheatley
v. Low, and the furniture in Siegel v. Spear & Co., came into the
possession of the respective defendants as the result of a promise to do
some act with reference to the chattels. But it is difficult to understand
why liability on a gratuitous promise should be limited to cases of
actively undertaking or beginning to do something with reference to
chattels delivered to the promisor. As much hardship can be suffered
by the promisee when he does not hand over a chattel to the promisor
as when he does. Indeed, in Thorne v. Deas the foundering of the
ship caused far greater monetary loss than occurred when the brandy
was spilled in Coggs v. Bernard.
As in the case of gratuitous promises to convey lands where the
donee has taken possession, courts confronted with the delivery of a
chattel accompanied by the recipient's promise to perform a certain
act respecting it are prone to find that there was a bargain with benefit
and detriment for both the promisor and promisee.118 They take delivery as the "consideration" requested for the promise. If this assumption accorded with the facts, such holdings would be unobjectionable.
But the assumption is incorrect, for there actually is no bargain.
111 Id. at 97.
llS Prince v.

Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 17 S. 449 (1895) is illustrative.
There plaintiff sent a picture for exhibition at the State Fair. It was exhibited and awarded
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However, there may be reliance on the promise and the avoidance
of injustice may require enforcement.
The relationship of bailor and bailee can arise by contract or by
other voluntary act of the parties.119 If there is such a relationship the
law imposes a duty to use care in handling the chattel on the bailee.
It is only when recovery from the bailee is sought on grounds other
than negligence in caring for it that the courts inquire as to the basis
for enforcing the promise. In such cases promissory estoppel may be
helpful where there is no bargain but there has been reliance evidenced
by an entrusting of a chattel to one who promises to act in a certain
way regarding it.
Illustrative cases of the enforcement of the bailee's promise include
the broker who was held liable in contract for handing over bonds,
gratuitously deposited with him by the plaintiff, to the latter's wife
on a forged order,1 20 as well as the broker who sends the bonds through
the mail where they are lost.121 Whether a chattel has been handed
over to defendant:1 22 or he promises gratuitously to dispose of property
already in his possession in a particular way,1 23 contractual liability
has been imposed. Occasionally a court has been frank enough to say
that it bases liability on the fact that defendant said he would act and
that plaintiff relied thereon.124
a prize. Unfortunately, it was never returned. The court said the "consideration" for
defendant's gratuitous promise to return the picture was the detriment and inconvenience
to the sender in transmitting the article. The difficulty with this solution is that the parties
didn't bargain; instead there was reliance on a promise. Similar cases include Kay County
Free Fair Assn. v. Martin, 190 Okla. 225, 122 P. (2d) 393 (1942) (A crocheted table
cloth worth $250); Vigo Agri. Soc. v. Brumfiel, 102 Ind. 146, I N.E. 382 (1885) ("The
bailment was not a gratuitous one, for the reason that the exhibition of the gun, in response
to the • • • advertisement of appellant, constituted a consideration for the undertaking");
Colburn v. Washington State Art Assn., 80 Wash. 662, 141 P. 1153 (1914). See note,
139 A.L.R. 931 (1942).

§133.
v. Manly, 49 N.Y. 192 (1872). Accord: Kierce's Admr. v. Farmers Bank,
174 Ky. 22, 191 S.W. 644 (1917) (Gratuitous deposit of three promissory notes with bank
by husband and wife, subsequently bank promised wife not to deliver notes or proceeds
to husband but did so; held, wife was entitled to go to ithe jury on the theory that the bank
was guilty of bad faith). Mis-delivery of a chattel by a bailee is a tort, so the question in
such cases is whether a contract remedy is available.
121 Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373, 378 (1873) (The bailee was held liable regardless of negligence). See also, Baer v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 328 (1927) where
defendant delivered plaintiff's merchandise to a third person who posed as an expressman.
The goods were never returned to plaintiff who had judgment.
122 Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 P. 459 (1911) (defendant who
gratuitously undertook to store and insure plaintiff's piano, was held liable for non-negligent
injuries caused by fire when he failed to insure).
123 Melbourne and Troy v. Louisville & N. R.R., 88 Ala. 443, 6 S. 762 (1889) (A
railroad gratuitously promised to deliver a car of merchandise already in its possession
beyond its destination and entered upon performance of said promise, but failed to notify
the connecting line; held, railroad is liable for damages resulting from the failure to notify
and it was error to sustain a demurrer).
124 Brown v. Ray, 10 Ired. L. (32 N.C.) 72 (1849): Plaintiff brought action on the
110 ANsoN,
120Kowing
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One is not to suppose, however, that all courts are willing to impose liability for every gratuitous promise, even when connected with
a bailment. Sometimes, as in a case where the bill of lading failed to
mention the route by which a barge load of goods was to be shipped
but the shipper in reliance on a subsequent oral promise to send via
a particular route secured insurance conditioned on shipment by the
route promised, the court holds that the parol evidence rule prevents
proof of the promise.125 On other occasions the court has attempted to
limit liability by finding that the promisor was, at most, guilty of nonfeasance rather than misfeasance and has denied liability on that
ground alone,126 or has said that the plaintiff could not recover because
he had failed to show negligence 'On the part of the bailee.127
An illustrative case refusing relief is Tomko v. Sharp.128 Sharp
gratuitously promised plaintiff to drive the latter's automobile to a
garage for repairs and then drive it back again. He drove to the garage.
After the car was repaired it was left outside in cold weather and
defendant failed to bring it back. As a result, the radiator froze and
burst while the car was unattended. When plaintiff sought damages,
he was refused. There was "a gratuitous bailment ... for the purpose of taking [the car to the garage] and . . . a gratuitous agreement to become bailee for the purpose of returning it," the court said,
and ruled that there was no liability for refusing to become bailee.
This was considered mere nonfeasance.

case because defendant refused to measure out 300 bushels of com which had been sold
to plaintiff by the sheriff in an execution against defendant, though at the time of sale
defendant promised plaintiff this would be done whenever he called for it. The court
relied on Coggs v. Bernard saying defendant "had entered upon the trust." Observe that
the liability here is in contract for failure to perform a promise to do something in the
future with the chattel, not in tort for caring for it negligently.
125 White v. Ashton, 51 N.Y. 280 (1873) •. But the parol evidence rule does not
apply to agreements made after the integration [WIGMORl!, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2441
(1940)], so the court erred in its reasoning. And the justifiable reliance on the promise
certainly harmed plaintiff. He should have recovered.
126 Newton v. Brook, 134 Ala. 269, 32 S. 722 (1902) (where defendant had agreed
with plaintiff to prepare for shipment by particular train, but failed to do so, it was held
that recovery could be had only on contract and, because the promise was gratuitous, there
was no liability). The promissory estoppel elements are all present here. The recovery
should be in contract, but on the basis of promissory estoppel, not on a bargained-for
equivalent.
127Ridenour v. Woodward, 132 Tenn. 620, 179 S.W. 148 (1915); Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505. See notes, 4 A.L.R. 1196 (1919), 26 A.L.R. 1208
(1923), 96 A.L.R. 909 (1935). Accord: Commonwealth Portland Cement Co. v. Weber,
Lohmann and Co., 91 L.T.R. 813 (1904) (defendant undertook gratuitously to pass goods
of plaintiff through the customs. The court said that waiting one day to act did not make
him liable for additional taxes due when customs duties were raised in the meanwhile).
12s 87 N.J.L. 385, ,94 A. 793 (1915).
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Regarded objectively, was defendant's failure to perform his promise the proximate cause of the damage? If it was not, there could
be no recovery in tort; plaintiff's only hope of recovery lay in inducing
the court to· impose liability for breach of defendant's promise. When
the court labeled the case as one of "nonfeasance," it foreclosed any
contract remedy save promissory estoppel.
Since all the elements of that doctrine were present, the court
might well have affirmed the lower court's judgment for plaintiff in
Tomko 11. Sharp. There is an additional ground for this conclusion
because the case shows that when defendant brought the car to the
repair shop the foreman asked him to drain the radiator. Instead of
doing that, he "smelled" the radiator, said there was alcohol in it and
walked away. Is he not guilty of "misfeasance" in that he purported to
check on the car's condition but made a mistake in judgment? Has he
not actually "undertaken" to guard against the thing feared? There is
a basis on which liability could have been imposed even on the court's
theory of misfeasance.
In addition, one could say that instead of making two promises, he
made only one-to drive the car to the repair shop and back. He drove
it there, thus entering on the performance of the promised act; but he
failed to complete the act because he did not return the car.
A consideration of the opinion in Tomko 11. Sharp and this analysis
indicates the wavering, artificial and dubious distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.129 Already, in the field of torts, there is an
inclination to seek a different approach. As Prosser says, if there is an
"assumption of control over the situation by which the interests of
another are affected more or less directly or an interference with other
possible sources of protection" there is a basis for liability. Why should
not the same reasoning apply in determining contractual liability for
gratuitous promises? One may well hold that just as the negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking can impose liability in tort, so a
gratuitous promise detrimentally relied upon may impose contractual
liability if it is not performed.130
In determining whether a gratuitous promisor is to be held to his
promise the court should consider the facts, including the making of
the promise, the action taken in reliance on it, and the injustice which
might result to either party if enforcement is decreed. Particularly
129PnossER, TonTs §33 (1941).
v. Moffat, 16 Vt. 271 (1844) (defendant held liable for failure to record
a deed where he accepted it and promised to record); Herzig v. Herzig, 67 Misc. 250, 122
N.Y.S. 440 (1910) (demurrer overruled where plaintiff alleged a delivery of a promissory
note to defendant, his promise to collect it, and his failure to try to do so).
180 Hyde
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in a case like Tomko v. Sharp, it will be helpful to weigh the deliberateness with which the promise was made.131 It may often be determinative.
From the foregoing it appears that promises made in connection
with gratuitous bailments may create contractual liability.132 Just as
with gratuitous promises to give land, so with gratuitous bailments;
liability begins with possession.133 But it is not the possession that
creates liability; rather, it is the promise which has induced injurious
reliance.
Promissory estoppel has its origins in diverse fields of the law. One
of the most fruitful of these fields is that of gratuitous bailment.134 The
analogies which can be drawn from this particular area have been most
helpful in the formulation of the doctrine.135 The enforcement of
gratuitous promises in the bailment category illustrates the pervasiveness of the principle on which the doctrine is based. Obvious also is
the compartmentalization which has existed in the application of the
doctrine. So long as it is applied only when the fact situation fits a
preconceived pattern, such as a gratuitous promise to give land, or a
gratuitous bailment, its possibilities will not be completely utilized.
The restraints of compartmentalization must be overcome if the courts
are to recognize that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is one of universal application.
To be concluded.
1 3 1 See, CardO'Zo, J., in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922):
"The casual response, made in mere friendliness or courtesy may not stand on the same
plane, when we come to consider who is to assume the risk of negligence or error, as the
deliberate certificate, indisputably an 'act in the law' intended to sway conduct." (tort case
against a public weigher who certified false weights).
IS2W1LLISTON, §138, p. 490: "It is still the law that a voluntary undertaking may
render one liable for the consequences of negligent failure to carry out the undertaking;
but in most cases of the sort the cause of action is now regarded as based on a tort. In one
class of cases, however, the transaction is still regarded as contractual, namely, gratuitous
agency, bailment, or trust." See CoRllIN, §207.
133 See cases cited in notes 120-124 supra. Arterburn, "Liability for Breach of Gratuitous Promises," 22 h.L. L. REv. 161 at 163 (1927): "••• a gratuitous promise may be
enforced if you can find a bailment peg to hang it on•••. If the gratuitous bailee holds so
much as a piece of paper representing a chose in action he may be held to his promise
regarding it•••."
134 The following articles will repay examination: Beale, "Gratuitous Undertakings,"
5 HARv. L. REv. 222 (1891); Shattuck, "Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?" 35 Mxca.
L. REv. 908 at 915 (1937); note, 9 CoRN. L.Q. 54 (1923).
135 PA'ITBRSON AND GOBLE, CASES ON CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., 394, note l (1941): "The
cases of a gratuitous undertaking to do something about the bailor's property, followed by
the bailor's delivery of the property and by either negligence injurious to the property or
refusal to redeliver it, furnished a backlog of analogies for the development of the modern
doctrine of promissory estoppel."

